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Abstract
We consider the problem of identification and authentication based on secret key generation from
some user-generated source data (e.g., a biometric source). The goal is to reliably identify users pre-
enrolled in a database as well as authenticate them based on the estimated secret key while preserving the
privacy of the enrolled data and of the generated keys. We characterize the optimal tradeoff between the
identification rate, the compression rate of the users’ source data, information leakage rate, and secret key
rate. In particular, we provide a coding strategy based on layered random binning which is shown to be
optimal. In addition, we study a related secure identification/authentication problem where an adversary
tries to deceive the system using its own data. Here the optimal tradeoff between the identification rate,
compression rate, leakage rate, and exponent of the maximum false acceptance probability is provided.
The results reveal a close connection between the optimal secret key rate and the false acceptance
exponent of the identification/authentication system.
Index Terms
Database, Access Control, Identification, Authentication, Biometric Security, Privacy, Secret Key,
Information Leakage, Binning, Side Information
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Consider an identification and authentication system with K users (see Fig. 1). In the enrollment phase,
each user w ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} generates a source sequence Xn(w) and provides it to the system. Such
source sequences are compressed into M¯ , {M(w) : w = 1, . . . ,K} and stored into a database. The
compressed user source data will be used as a reference for identification of the enrolled users. At the
same time, the system produces a set of secret keys {S(w) : w = 1, . . . ,K}, also functions of the
users’ source sequences, which will be used as a reference for authentication of the identified user. In
the identification/authentication phase, an a-priori unknown user W provides a measurement Y n to the
system. For example, this could be seen as a noisy version of its enrolled source sequence Xn(W ). Based
on the stored database M¯ and measurement Y n, the user is identified as Wˆ . The system also produces
an estimated key Sˆ. The user is successfully identified and authenticated if (Wˆ , Sˆ) = (W,S(W )).
Xn(1)
Xn(2)
Xn(K)
M¯
Xn(W )
PY,Z|X
Y n
Zn
Wˆ
Sˆ
S(1), . . . , S(K) S(Wˆ )
yes/no
= ?
select
dec
enc
adversary
y˜n(M¯, Zn)
enrollment phase
identification/authentication phase
Fig. 1. Identification and secret key-based authentication system with an adversary. The enrollment phase is contained in the
green box. The remaining part corresponds to the identification/authentication phase. The red dashed arrow corresponds to an
active adversary which replaces the original user measurement Y n with its own generated signal y˜n(M¯, Zn) in order to gain
access to the system.
The system described above can be relevant in several applications including those involving access
control, secure, and trustworthy communication. In database identification for access control applications,
the system identifies an individual as an enrolled user and then grants the corresponding access based on
authentication using the secret-key. In other words, the system first finds out which user in the database
3the individual corresponds to, and then verifies whether the individual is really the user he/she claims to
be.
One important class of access control applications is related to using biometric data such as fingerprint,
iris scans, voice, face, and DNA sequences (see, e.g., [1] and references therein). Unlike passwords, the
biometric data inherently belong to the users and provide a convenient and seemingly more secure way
for identification/authentication. However, it is crucial that privacy of the enrolled data must be protected
from any inference of an adversary. The privacy risk in this case is of potentially high impact since
the biometric data is typically tied to the person identity. If it is compromised, it cannot be reverted or
changed easily, unlike in the case of a password.
In this work, we consider secret-key based identification and authentication problems in the presence
of an adversary which is not part of the system but has full knowledge of the stored database data M¯
as well as to some “on-line” side information Zn, as shown in Fig. 1. We refer to Zn as on-line side
information since it is statistically dependent on the actual user W which is trying to be identified and
authenticated. In contrast, the knowledge of M¯ can be regarded as “off-line” side information for the
adversary. Two closely related scenarios are studied:
1) The adversary is passive and is only interested in inferring the user source sequence. In this case,
we wish to design a reliable identification/authentication system that achieves maximal identification
rate and secret key rate (see definitions in Section II-A) while minimizing the the compression rate
of the stored descriptions and the information leakage of the enrolled source sequences. In general,
there exists tension between these performance metrics. For this scenario, our main contribution is
a single-letter characterization of the optimal tradeoff region of the identification rate, compression
rate, information leakage rate, and key rate for discrete memoryless sources.
2) The adversary is active and tries to deceive the identification/authentication system by using its
own sequence Y n = y˜n(M¯, Zn). We refer to the event where the legitimate user fails during
the identification/authentication as a false rejection, and to the event where the system accepts the
adversary as a false acceptance. In this case, we wish to design a secure identification/authentication
system that achieves arbitrarily small false rejection probability with maximum identification rate
and: i) minimizes the compression rate of each stored description, ii) minimizes the leakage rate
of each enrolled sources, and iii) maximizes the error exponent of the maximum false acceptance
probability (mFAP) (see definitions in Section III-A). For this scenario, our main contribution is
a single-letter characterization of the optimal tradeoff between the identification rate, compression
rate, information leakage rate, and mFAP exponent for discrete memoryless sources.
4In order to motivate the role of key-based authentication to the possibly unfamiliar readers, we use
the following naive everyday-life example. Consider the front door of a building with an intercom with
multiple buttons. Each button corresponds to an apartment in the building. An intruder may wish to gain
access to the building by hitting at random a button, hoping that the people inside the corresponding
apartment just open the door, by identifying the intruder as friend/family just because he/she hit their
button. Instead, if the intercom is also equipped with a camera and a facial recognition software, the door
will be opened only if the intruder face (properly projected into some features space) generates a hashing
function value that matches with the key corresponding to that apartment. Technically speaking, the
optimal identification problem corresponds to K-ary hypothesis testing, which just provides the answer
minimizing the average probability of wrong identification. However, the identified user needs also to be
authenticated (in this case, by showing his/her face) in order to rightfully gain access to the system.
Related Work
Authentication problems have been studied from an information theoretic perspective in several direc-
tions. Maurer in [2] considered the message authentication problem in connection with the hypothesis test-
ing problem where the underlying message probability distributions of the legitimate user and adversary
are assumed to be different. Martinian et al. [3] considered authentication with a distortion criterion. More
recently, some works have considered authentication based on secret key generation [4] which are closely
related to fuzzy extractor [5]. These include, for example, Lai et al., and Ignatenko and Willems [6],
[7], [8], [9], [10], which focused on biometric authentication systems [11] where privacy of the enrolled
data is also taken into account. In [12], we considered a general case where the adversary has correlated
side information and we provided a complete characterization of the fundamental tradeoff. Analysis
of deception probability in authentication systems from an adversary’s perspective was also considered
in [13]. Closely related to the secret key-based authentication problem with privacy constraint are the
problems of source coding with privacy constraint, e.g., [14], [15], where the goals are to reconstruct
the source reliably while preserving the privacy of the source or the reconstruction sequences from the
inference of an eavesdropper.
By extending the single-user authentication problem to the identification/authentication problem in the
multi-user case, another dimension is added into the problem, namely we also care for the identification
rate. A database identification problem for biometric data was considered in [16], [17] where the noisy
measurement of all user data are treated as a database and the maximum identification rate was charac-
terized. Later, Tuncel [18] considered the problem where the database is a compressed version of the user
5data and showed the optimal tradeoff between identification rate and compression rate. Recently, this was
extended to include also a lossy reconstruction constraint at the decoder [19]. Ignatenko and Willems [20]
studied the problem of user identification together with secret key-based authentication under a privacy
constraint, extending the secret-key based authentication problem to the multi-user setting.
Contribution and Organization
In this work we extend the setting of [20] to a more general case, including a compression rate constraint
on the source description and allowing the adversary to have access to correlated side information. The
setting of this paper can also be viewed as a multi-user extension of our previous work [12]. Correlated
side information at the adversary, as treated here, is of practical interest since it models scenarios
where the adversary can have access to noisy version of the source data. In Section II, we study the
secret key-based identification with a privacy constraint and provide a complete characterization of the
identification-compression-leakage-key rate region R1 for discrete memoryless sources. It is shown that
the layered binning scheme with rate allocation between compression and identification only on the first-
layer description is optimal. The result includes many other results as special cases, one of which is the
compression-leakage-key rate region for secret key-based authentication problem in [12]. Binary examples
illustrating the derived tradeoffs are also provided. In Section III, we study a secure identification problem
with a privacy constraint and provide a complete characterization of the identification-compression-
leakage-mFAP exponent region R2 for discrete memoryless sources. Our results show that the maximum
key rate in R1 is equivalent to the maximum mFAP exponent in R2, revealing a connection between
secret key rate and security of identification/authentication system.
Notation: We denote discrete random variables, their corresponding realizations or deterministic values,
and their alphabets by the upper case, lower case, and calligraphic letters, respectively. Xnm denotes the
sequence {Xm, . . . , Xn} when m ≤ n, and the empty set otherwise. Also, we use the shorthand notation
Xn for Xn1 . The term X
n\i denotes the set {X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn}. When a random variable X
is constant we write X = ∅. A length-K vector of descriptions (M(1), . . . ,M(K)) is denoted by M¯ ,
where M¯\W is the vector (M(1), . . . ,M(W − 1),M(W + 1), . . . ,M(K)). Cardinality of the set X is
denoted by |X |. We use [1 : N ] to denote the index set {1, 2, . . . , N}. Finally, we use X − Y − Z to
indicate that (X,Y, Z) forms a Markov chain. Other notations follow the standard ones in [21].
6II. SECRET KEY-BASED IDENTIFICATION/AUTHENTICATION WITH A PRIVACY CONSTRAINT
A. Problem Formulation
Let us consider a secret key-based identification and authentication system as shown in Fig. 1. Source,
measurement and side information alphabets, X ,Y,Z are finite sets. The users’ source sequences Xn(w)
for w ∈ W(n) , [1 : K] are independent across the users and have i.i.d. components distributed according
to some fixed source distribution PX . In the enrollment phase, an encoder generates a description M(w)
and a secret key message S(w) based on Xn(w), for each w ∈ W(n). The descriptions are stored in a
database for later identification and authentication. In the identification/authentication phase, an arbitrary
unknown user W ∈ W(n), independent of the enrolled source sequences and stored database, presents
itself to the system, and generates measurement sequence Y n jointly distributed with Xn(W ). Based on
Y n and the stored database M¯ , (M(1),M(2), . . . ,M(K)), a decoder identifies the observed user as
Wˆ and generates an estimation of the key Sˆ. The identification and authentication operation is successful
if (Wˆ , Sˆ) = (W,S(W )).
We consider an adversary which has access to the whole database M¯ and to a side information sequence
Zn also jointly distributed with Xn(W ). The information leakage rate of user W at the adversary is
measured by the mutual information rate I(Xn(W ); M¯, Zn)/n. Similarly, the key leakage rate of user
W at the adversary is measured by the mutual information rate I(S(W ); M¯, Zn)/n.
In this work we assume that (Xn(W ), Y n, Zn) are memoryless (with respect to the sequence index i)
with the i-th marginal joint distribution PX,Y,Z = PXPY,Z|X , where PY,Z|X is a given transition proba-
bility distribution of a discrete memoryless broadcast channel (see Fig. 1). In contrast, for all w 6= W ,
the triples (Xn(w), Y n, Zn) are memoryless with the i-th marginal distribution PXPY,Z , where PY,Z is
the YZ-marginal distribution of PX,Y,Z .
We are interested in characterizing the optimal tradeoff between the identification rate, compression
rate, information leakage rate, and secret key rate, defined as follows:
Definition 1: An (|M(n)|, |W(n)|, |S(n)|, n)-code for secret key-based identification and authentication
with a privacy constraint consists of
• A set of stochastic encoders F (n)w : w ∈ W(n) such that the w-th encoder takes Xn(w) as input and
generates (M(w), S(w)) ∈M(n) × S(n) according to a conditional PMF p(m(w), s(w)|xn(w)).
• A decoder g(n)Id :M(n)
K × Yn →W(n), such that the identified user is Wˆ = g(n)Id (M¯, Y n).
• A decoder g(n)Au :M(n)
K × Yn → S(n), such that the estimated secret key is Sˆ = g(n)Au (M¯, Y n).
♦
7Definition 2: An identification-compression-leakage-keyrate tuple (RI , RC , L,RS) ∈ R4+ is said to be
achievable if, for any δ > 0 there exists a sequence of (|M(n)|, |W(n)|, |S(n)|, n)-codes such that, for all
sufficiently large n,
max
W∈W(n)
P((Wˆ , Sˆ) 6= (W,S(W ))) ≤ δ, (1)
1
n
log
∣∣W(n)∣∣ ≥ RI − δ, (2)
1
n
log
∣∣M(n)∣∣ ≤ RC + δ, (3)
max
W∈W(n)
1
n
I(Xn(W ); M¯, Zn) ≤ L+ δ, (4)
max
W∈W(n)
1
n
I(S(W ); M¯, Zn) ≤ δ, (5)
min
W∈W(n)
1
n
H(S(W )) ≥ RS − δ, (6)
The identification-compression-leakage-keyrate regionR1 is defined as the closure of all achievable tuples.
♦
B. Results
Theorem 1: The region R1 for the identification/authentication problem defined above is given by a
set of all tuples (RI , RC , L,RS) ∈ R4+ such that
RI ≤ I(Y ;U), (7)
RC ≥ RI + I(X;V |Y ), (8)
L ≥ I(X;V, Y )− I(X;Y |U) + I(X;Z|U), (9)
RS ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U), (10)
for some PX,Y,ZPV |XPU |V with |U| ≤ |X |+ 4, |V| ≤ (|X |+ 4)(|X |+ 2). 
By standard time-sharing argument [22], it is immediate to show that R1 is convex.
Before giving the proof of Theorem 1, some remarks are in order.
Remark 1 (Layered random binning): Binning usually helps to reduce the rate needed for compression.
In the related identification problem [19] the authors showed that the binning scheme is optimal when
an additional reconstruction constraint is included. As we shall see in the proof of Theorem 1, layered
binning turns out to be also optimal in the presence of an information leakage constraint towards an
adversary with access to correlated side information. Interestingly, we note that the obtained tradeoff
8between compression and identification rates in (8) results from the rate allocation which is applied only
on the first layered codeword.
Remark 2 (Special cases): Theorem 1 recovers results of several special cases in the literature.
i) When there is only one user in the database, i.e., |W(n)| = 1, the problem reduces to authentication
with a privacy constraint studied in [12] (see e.g., Fig. 2). It can also be viewed as an extension of the
secret key agreement problem with one-way communication constraint [23] to include an information
leakage constraint. By setting RI = 0 in R1, we obtain the compression-leakage-keyrate region consisting
of all tuples (RC , L,RS) such that
RC ≥ I(X;V |Y ),
L ≥ I(X;V, Y )− I(X;Y |U) + I(X;Z|U),
RS ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U),
for some joint distributions of the form PX,Y,ZPV |XPU |V with |U| ≤ |X |+ 3, |V| ≤ (|X |+ 3)(|X |+ 2).
PY,Z|X
Y n
Zn
Sˆ
yes/no
= ?
dec
enc
adversary
enrollment phase
Xn
Xn
M
S
authentication phase
Fig. 2. Secret key generation for authentication with a privacy constraint.
ii) When restricting to the case without secret key-based authentication (RS = 0), the problem reduces
to identification with a privacy constraint. By setting V = U in R1, we obtain the identification-
9compression-leakage rate region consisting of all tuples (RI , RC , L) such that
RI ≤ I(Y ;U),
RC ≥ RI + I(X;U |Y ),
L ≥ I(X;U,Z),
for some joint distributions of the form PX,Y,ZPU |X . Furthermore, without the leakage constraint, this
result recovers the optimal compression-identification rate (capacity/storage) tradeoff in [18], [19].
iii) When there is no compression rate constraint (i.e., RC = H(X)) and, furthermore, the adversary
has no “on-line” side information (i.e., Z = ∅), the region reduces to the set of all tuples (RI , L,RS)
such that
RI ≤ I(Y ;U),
L ≥ I(X;V, Y )− I(X;Y |U) = I(X;V |Y ) + I(Y ;U),
RS ≤ I(V ;Y |U) = I(Y ;V )− I(Y ;U),
for some joint distributions of the form PX,Y PV |XPU |V . By setting RI = I(Y ;U) in the expression
above (thus restricting the region to a potentially smaller set), we recover the result in [20], i.e., we
obtain an achievable region that coincides with the region derived in [20].
Proof of Theorem 1: Achievability is proved based on a random coding argument where we use
the definitions and properties of -typicality as in [21].
Achievability: Our achievable scheme utilizes layered coding, binning, and subbinning as illustrated
in Fig. 3.1 Fix PV |X and PU |V . Let  and δ be positive real numbers where δ → 0 as → 0. Assume
that I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U) > 0. Note also that the joint distribution PX,Y,ZPV |XPU |V implies that
U − V −X − (Y,Z) forms a Markov chain.
1) Codebook generation: Randomly and independently generate codewords un(j) for j ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;U)+δ)],
1Intuition for our achievable scheme is as follows. We use two layers of codewords {Un} and {V n} to be able to adapt to the
presence of the adversary by controlling the information leakage via the descriptions M . Since the decoder has side information
Y n, binning is used to reduce the compression rate at each layer. This also essentially reduces the information leakage rate.
Moreover, we divide the second layered bin into subbins for the secret key in order to prevent the key leakage. We note that the
availability of side information Zn at the adversary has an impact on the structure of the achievable scheme. If Zn becomes
degenerate, i.e., Z = ∅, then it can be shown that the second layer of codewords and subbinning are not required to achieve the
optimal identification-compression-leakage-keyrate region.
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1
un(m1,m
′) ∼ PU
vn(m1,m
′,m2, s, s′) ∼ PV |U
m1 = 1
m2 = 1 2
2
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
2n(I(Y ;U)−RI−δϵ)
2n(I(Y ;V |U)−2δϵ)
2n(I(X;U|Y )+RI+2δϵ)
2n(I(X;V |U,Y )+3δϵ)
s = 1 2 · · · 2n(I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;Z|U)−δϵ)
Fig. 3. Layered binning; rate allocation between compression and identification only applies to the first layered codewords,
i.e., m1 ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;U|Y )+RI+2δ)]. The bin indices (m1,m2) are sent to the decoder as a helping data. The secret key is
chosen as a subbin index s of the chosen codeword vn.
according to the product distribution
∏n
i=1 PU (ui). Choosing some identification rate
RI ≤ I(U ;Y )− δ, (11)
we distribute the codewords uniformly at random into 2n(I(X;U |Y )+RI+2δ) bins bU (m1), m1 ∈ [1 :
2n(I(X;U |Y )+RI+2δ)]. Each bin contains 2n(I(U ;Y )−RI−δ) codewords, each indexed by m′, where I(X;U)−
I(X;U |Y ) = I(U ;Y ) follows from the fact that U−X−Y . There exists a one-to-one mapping between
index j and the pair of bin/codeword indices (m1,m′) such that, without loss of generality, we can
identify j = (m1,m′).
For each j, randomly and conditionally independently generate codewords vn(j, k) for k ∈ [1 :
2n(I(X;V |U)+δ)], according to the conditional product distribution
∏n
i=1 PV |U (vi|ui(j)), and distribute
these codewords uniformly at random into 2n(I(X;V |U,Y )+3δ) bins bV (j,m2), m2 ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;V |U,Y )+3δ)].
Each bin bV (j,m2) contains 2n(I(V ;Y |U)−2δ) codewords, where I(X;V |U)−I(X;V |U, Y ) = I(V ;Y |U)
follows from the fact that U−V −X−Y . Moreover, the codewords of each bin bV (j,m2) are distributed
uniformly at random into subbins, indexed by s, where s ∈ [1 : 2n(I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;Z|U)−δ)]. The index
s here represents a subbin index of the second-layered bin. In each subbin, there are 2n(I(V ;Z|U)−δ)
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codewords, each indexed by s′. There exists a one-to-one mapping between index k and the triple
of bin/subbin/codeword indices (m2, s, s′) such that, without loss of generality, we can identify k =
(m2, s, s
′).
2) Enrollment: For each user w ∈ [1 : K], given Xn(w) = xn(w), the encoder looks for un(j) that
is jointly typical with xn(w) and then for vn(j, k) that is jointly typical with (xn(w), un(j)). From the
covering lemma [21], with high probability, there exist such codeword pairs since there are more than
2nI(X;U) codewords un(j) and, for each j, there are more than 2nI(X;V |U) codewords vn(j, k). If there are
more than one such pairs, the encoder selects one of them uniformly at random. Let the chosen codeword
indices of user w be denoted by (j(w), k(w)) = (m1(w),m′(w),m2(w), s(w), s′(w)). The encoder stores
the corresponding bin indices m1(w) and m2(w) into the database as the stored description of user w.
The compression rate of each user is thus given by
RC = I(X;U |Y ) +RI + I(X;V |U, Y ) + 5δ
= I(X;V |Y ) +RI + 5δ, (12)
where the second equality follows from the chain rule I(X;U |Y ) + I(X;V |U, Y ) = I(X;U, V |Y ) and
from the fact that I(X;U, V |Y ) = I(X;V |Y ) due to U−(V, Y )−X . The secret key corresponding to user
w is given by the subbin index s(w) in which the chosen sequence vn(j(w), k(w)) ∈ bV (j(w),m2(w))
is found.
3) Identification/Authentication: Given an arbitrary user W ∈ [1 : K], let yn denote the realization of
the corresponding measurement sequence Y n.
The decoder has bin indices (m¯1, m¯2) = ((m1(1), . . . ,m1(K)), (m2(1), . . . ,m2(K))) and observes
yn. Then, for each w ∈ [1 : K], it looks into the corresponding bins bU (m1(w)) and bV (m1(w),m′,m2(w))
for all indices m′ forming bin bV (m1(w),m′,m2(w)), and check if there exists a codeword pair
(un(m1(w),m
′), vn(m1(w),m′,m2(w), s, s′))
jointly typical with yn for some m′, s, s′. Suppose that there exists a unique wˆ for which this condition
holds. Then, the decoder outputs the identified user wˆ. Otherwise, if none or more than one user index
satisfy the condition, an identification failure is declared. Suppose that such unique wˆ is found. Then,
the decoder outputs also sˆ to be the s-index of one of the codeword pairs
(un(m1(wˆ),m
′), vn(m1(wˆ),m′,m2(wˆ), s, s′))
satisfying the typicality condition. If there exist more than one such indices s, one is chosen at random.
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Finally, the decoder compares sˆ with s(wˆ), and declares the identified user as successfully authenticated
if sˆ = s(wˆ).
Let Un(M1(w),M ′) and V n(M1(w),M ′,M2(w), S(w), S′) be the codewords chosen at the encoder
for each w ∈ [1 : K] in the enrollment phase, and (M¯1, M¯2) be the corresponding index vectors of
the bins stored in the database. We note that by symmetry of the codebook generation, the analysis of
identification/authentication error does not depend on which user W ∈ [1 : K] is present to the system.
Suppose that a user W = w is present. The relevant identification/authentication error events are:
E0 : {(Y n, Un(M1(w),M ′), V n(M1(w),M ′,M2(w), S(w), S′)) /∈ T (n) (Y, U, V )}
EId : {(Y n, Un(M1(wˆ),m′), V n(M1(wˆ),m′,M2(wˆ), s, s′)) ∈ T (n) (Y,U, V ) for some wˆ 6= w and m′, s, s′}
EAu : {(Y n, Un(M1(w),M ′), V n(M1(w),M ′,M2(w), sˆ, s′)) ∈ T (n) (Y,U, V ) for some sˆ 6= S(w) and s′}.
For any W = w, by LLN, (Xn, Un(M1(w),M ′), V n(M1(w),M ′,M2(w), S(w), S′), Y n, Zn) are
jointly typical with high probability. Thus, P(E0) → 0 as n → ∞. From the packing lemma [21],
P(EId ∪ EAu) → 0 as n → ∞ if 1n logK · |M′||S||S ′| < I(Y ;U, V ) and 1n log |S||S ′| < I(Y ;V |U),
where K = 2n(RI−δ). These conditions are satisfied by the code construction.
Note that here we show that the average probability of identification/authentication error P((Wˆ , Sˆ) 6=
(W,S(W )) can be made arbitrary small for n sufficiently large. Using the expurgation argument with re-
spect to the user index W , it can be shown that the maximal error probability of identification/authentication
maxW∈W(n) P((Wˆ , Sˆ) 6= (W,S(W )) can also be made arbitrary small at the same asymptotic identifi-
cation rate RI .
Before proceeding with the analysis of leakage rate, we give a lemma which provides a bound on the
n-letter conditional entropy based on properties of jointly typical sequences.
Lemma 1: Let J(w) be the index of codeword Un. If P((Un(J(w)), Zn) ∈ T (n) ) → 1 as n → ∞,
we have that H(Zn|J(w)) ≤ n(H(Z|U) + δ).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Information leakage analysis: For any W = w ∈ [1 : K], the information leakage averaged over all
13
randomly chosen codebook Cn can be bounded as follows.
I(Xn(w); M¯1, M¯2, Z
n|Cn)
(a)
= I(Xn(w);M1(w),M2(w), Z
n|Cn)
= H(Xn(w))−H(Xn(w)|M1(w),M2(w), Zn, Cn)
≤ nH(X)−H(Xn(w)|J(w), Zn, Cn) +H(M2(w)|Cn)
≤ nH(X)−H(Xn(w), Zn) +H(J(w)|Cn) +H(Zn|J(w), Cn) +H(M2(w)|Cn)
(b)
≤ −nH(Z|X) + n(I(X;U) + δ) + n(H(Z|U) + δ) + n(I(X;V |U, Y ) + 3δ)
(c)
≤ n(I(X;V, Y )− I(X;Y |U) + I(X;Z|U) + δ′),
where (a) follows since given the codebook, Xn(w) − (M1(w),M2(w), Zn) − (M¯\w1 , M¯\w2 ) forms a
Markov chain, (b) follows from the memoryless property of the sources, from the codebook generation
where J(w) ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;U)+δ)] and M2(w) ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;V |U,Y )+3δ)], and from bounding the term
H(Zn|J(w)) as in Lemma 1, and (c) follows from the Markov chain U − V − X − (Y,Z) for some
δ′ ≥ 5δ. The information leakage constraint is satisfied if
L ≥ I(X;V, Y )− I(X;Y |U) + I(X;Z|U). (13)
Key rate analysis: For any W = w ∈ [1 : K], we consider the following bound on the secret key rate.
H(S(w)|Cn) ≥ H(S(w)|J(w),M2(w), S′(w), Cn)
= H(S(w), J(w),M2(w), S
′(w)|Cn)−H(J(w),M2(w), S′(w)|Cn)
(a)
≥ H(Un, V n|Cn)−H(J(w)|Cn)−H(M2(w)|Cn)−H(S′(w)|Cn)
(b)
≥ n(I(X;U, V )− 2δ)− n(I(X;U) + δ)− n(I(X;V |U, Y ) + 3δ)− n(I(V ;Z|U)− δ)
≥ n(I(Y ;V |U)− I(Z;V |U)− δ′),
where (a) follows since given the codebook, codewords (Un, V n) are functions of (J(w),K(w)) =
(J(w),M2(w), S(w), S
′(w)) and (b) follows from the codebook generation where J(w) ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;U)+δ)]
and M2(w) ∈ [1 : 2n(I(X;V |U,Y )+3δ)] and since probability of a specific pair (un, vn) being selected in the
enrollment can be bounded by p(un, vn) ≤ ∑xn(w)∈T (n) (X|un,vn) p(xn(w)) ≤ 2−n(I(X;U,V )−2δ), where
the last inequality follows from properties of jointly typical sequences. Therefore, the key rate constraint
is satisfied if
RS ≤ I(Y ;V |U)− I(Z;V |U). (14)
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Key leakage analysis: For any W = w ∈ [1 : K], the key leakage averaged over all possible codebooks
can be bounded as follows.
I(S(w); M¯1, M¯2, Z
n|Cn) (a)= I(S(w);M1(w),M2(w), Zn|Cn)
≤ H(S(w)|Cn)−H(S(w)|J(w),M2(w), Zn, Cn)
= H(S(w)|Cn)−H(S(w), J(w),M2(w), Zn|Cn) +H(J(w),M2(w), Zn|Cn)
≤ H(S(w)|Cn)−H(S(w), J(w),M2(w), Zn, S′(w)|Cn) +H(S′(w)|S(w), J(w),M2(w), Zn, Cn)
+H(J(w)|Cn) +H(M2(w)|Cn) +H(Zn|J(w), Cn)
(b)
≤ H(S(w)|Cn)−H(Un, V n, Zn|Cn) + nn +H(J(w)|Cn) +H(M2(w)|Cn) +H(Zn|J(w), Cn)
(c)
≤ H(S(w)|Cn)− n(I(X;U, V ) +H(Z|U, V )− 2δ) + nn + n(I(X;U) + δ)
+ n(I(X;V |U, Y ) + 3δ) + n(H(Z|U) + δ)
(d)
≤ nδ′′ , (15)
where (a) follows since given the codebook, S(w)−(M1(w),M2(w), Zn)−(M¯\w1 , M¯\w2 ) forms a Markov
chain, (b) follows since given the codebook, codewords (Un, V n) are functions of (J(w),K(w)) =
(J(w),M2(w), S(w), S
′(w)), and from the Fano’s inequality H(S′(w)|S(w), J(w),M2(w), Zn) ≤ nn
which holds because from the codebook generation, the number of possible codewords V n for a given
(J(w),M2(w), S(w)) is less than 2nI(V ;Z|U) and therefore with high probability V n (and thus S′(w)) can
be decoded given (S(w), J(w),M2(w), Un, Zn), (c) follows from bounding the term H(Un, V n, Zn)
using properties of jointly typical sequences, i.e.,
p(un, vn, zn) ≤
∑
xn(w)∈T (n) (X|un,vn,zn)
p(xn(w), zn)
≤ 2−n(H(X,Z)−H(X|U,V,Z)−2δ) = 2−n(I(X;U,V )+H(Z|U,V )−2δ),
where the equality holds since Z −X − (U, V ), from the codebook generation, and from Lemma 1, and
finally (d) follows from the codebook generation where S(w) ∈ [1 : 2n(I(Y ;V |U)−I(Z;V |U)−δ)].
Given (15), combining (11) to (14) and invoking the random coding argument complete the achievability
proof.
Converse: We prove the converse for the average probability of error with respect to a user W randomly
selected with uniform probability over the set [1 : K]. Clearly, the average probability of error is less than
or equal to the maximal probability of error over the users, such that the achievable region with respect
to this less restrictive criterion contains the one with respect to the criterion given in our definition. The
converse here implies that the two regions match and therefore completes the proof of the theorem.
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Conditioned on W = w, the joint PMF of all relevant random variables is given by
PXn(1),...,Xn(K),M(1),...,M(K),S(1),...,S(K),Y n,Zn|W=w
= PXn(w),M(w),S(w),Y n,Zn|W=w
K∏
j=1,j 6=w
PXn(j),M(j),S(j)|W=w
= PXn(w),M(w),S(w)|W=wPY n,Zn|Xn(w)
K∏
j=1,j 6=w
PXn(j),M(j),S(j)|W=w,
where PXn(j)(xn) =
∏n
i=1 PX(xi) for j ∈ [1 : K], and PY n,Zn|Xn(w)(yn, zn|xn) =
∏n
i=1 PY,Z|X(yi, zi|xi).
Let us define Ui , (W,M(W ), Y ni+1, Zi−1) and Vi , (W,M(W ), S(W ), Y ni+1, Zi−1) which satisfy
Ui − Vi −Xi(W ) − (Yi, Zi) for all i = 1, . . . , n. This can be seen as Ui is included in Vi and (Yi, Zi)
is independent of Vi given Xi(W ) due to the memoryless property of the “channel” PY,Z|X . For any
achievable tuple (RI , RC , L,RS) ∈ R4+, we have Fano’s inequality H(W,S(W )|M¯, Y n) ≤ nn.
It then follows that
n(RI − δn) ≤ H(W ) = H(W |M¯, Y n) + I(W ; M¯, Y n)
(a)
≤ nn + I(W ; M¯, Y n)
(b)
= nn + I(W ;Y
n|M¯)
≤ nn +H(Y n)−H(Y n|W, M¯)
(c)
= nn +H(Y
n)−H(Y n|W,M(W )) (16)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi)−H(Yi|W,M(W ), Y ni+1, Zi−1) + nn,
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;Ui) + nn,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality H(W |M¯, Y n) ≤ H(W,S(W )|M¯, Y n) ≤ nn, (b) follows
from the fact that W is independent of M¯ , (c) follows from the fact that conditioned on W = w, we
have that Y n−M(w)− M¯\w forms a Markov chain (see Appendix B (I) for the proof), and (d) follows
from the definition of Ui.
16
Next,
n(RC −RI + δn) ≥ H(M(W ))−H(W )
(a)
≥ H(M(W ))− I(Y n;W,M(W ))− nn
= −H(W |M(W )) +H(W,M(W )|Y n)− nn
≥ −H(W |M(W )) +H(W,M(W ), S(W )|M¯\W , Y n)−H(S(W )|M¯,W, Y n)
−H(M(W ), S(W )|M¯\W , Y n, Xn(W ), Zn)− nn
(b)
= −H(W |M¯,Xn(W ), S(W )) + P
(c)
= −H(W |M¯,Xn(W ), S(W ), Y n, Zn) + P
where (a) follows from (16), (b) follows since W is independent of (M¯,Xn(W ), S(W )) and the
definition P , H(W,M(W ), S(W )|M¯\W , Y n) − H(M(W ), S(W )|M¯\W , Y n, Xn(W ), Zn) − nn −
H(S(W )|M¯,W, Y n), and (c) follows from the fact that we have I(W ;Y n, Zn|M¯,Xn(W ), S(W )) = 0
or equivalently H(Y n, Zn|M¯,Xn(W ), S(W )) − H(Y n, Zn|M¯,Xn(W ), S(W ),W ) ≤ 0 which holds
since i) conditioned on W = w, (Y n, Zn)−Xn(w)− (M¯, S(w)) forms a Markov chain (see Appendix
B (II)) and ii) we have the Markov chain W − Xn(W ) − (Y n, Zn) derived from the given “channel”
PY,Z|X .
Continuing the chain of inequalities and substituting the value of P , we get
n(RC −RI + δn) ≥ H(W,M(W ), S(W )|M¯\W , Y n)−H(S(W )|M¯,W, Y n)
−H(W,M(W ), S(W )|M¯\W , Y n, Xn(W ), Zn)− nn
(d)
≥ I(W,M(W ), S(W );Xn(W ), Zn|M¯\W , Y n)− 2nn
(e)
≥ H(Xn(W ), Zn|W,Y n)−H(Xn(W ), Zn|W, M¯, S(W ), Y n)− 2nn
(f)
= H(Xn(W ), Zn|Y n)−H(Xn(W ), Zn|W, M¯, S(W ), Y n)− 2nn
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi(W ), Zi|Yi)−H(Xi(W ), Zi|W,M(W ), S(W ), Y ni+1, Zi−1, Yi)− 2nn
(g)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi(W );Vi|Yi)− 2nn,
where (d) follows from Fano’s inequality where H(S(W )|M¯,W, Y n) ≤ H(W,S(W )|M¯, Y n) ≤ nn,
(e) follows from the fact that H(Xn(W ), Zn|M¯\W , Y n) ≥ H(Xn(W ), Zn|M¯\W , Y n,W ) and that
conditioned on W = w, we have the Markov chain (Xn(w), Zn)−Y n−M¯\w (see Appendix B (III)), (f)
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follows from the facts that W is independent of Xn(W ) and the Markov chain W −Xn(W )−(Y n, Zn),
and finally (g) follows from the definition of Vi.
The information leakage can be bounded as follows.
n(L+ δn) ≥ max
W∈W(n)
I(Xn(W ); M¯, Zn) ≥ 1
K
K∑
w=1
I(Xn(w); M¯, Zn|W = w)
= I(Xn(W ); M¯, Zn|W )
(a)
= I(Xn(W );W, M¯, Zn)
= I(Xn(W );W, M¯, S(W ), Y n)− I(Xn(W );S(W )|W, M¯, Y n)
− I(Xn(W );Y n|W, M¯) + I(Xn(W );Zn|W, M¯)
(b)
≥ I(Xn(W );W, M¯, S(W ), Y n)− nn − I(Xn(W );Y n|W, M¯) + I(Xn(W );Zn|W, M¯)
(c)
≥ I(Xn(W );W,M(W ), S(W ), Y n)− nn − I(Xn(W );Y n|W,M(W )) + I(Xn(W );Zn|W,M(W )),
where (a) follows from the fact that Xn(W ) is independent of W , (b) follows from Fano’s inequality,
H(S(W )|W, M¯, Y n) ≤ H(W,S(W )|M¯, Y n) ≤ nn, and (c) follows from the fact that conditioned on
W = w, we have the Markov chain (Xn(w), Y n, Zn, S(w))−M(w)− M¯\w (see Appendix B (IV)).
Continuing the chain of inequalities, we have
n(L+ δn) ≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi(W ))−H(Xi(W )|W,M(W ), S(W ), Xi−1(W ), Y n)−H(Yi|W,M(W ), Y ni+1)
+H(Yi|W,M(W ), Y ni+1, Xn(W )) +H(Zi|W,M(W ), Zi−1)−H(Zi|W,M(W ), Zi−1, Xn(W ))− nn
(d)
≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi(W ))−H(Xi(W )|W,M(W ), S(W ), Xi−1(W ), Y n, Zi−1)− I(Yi;Xi(W ))
+ I(Yi;W,M(W ), Y
n
i+1) + I(Zi;Xi(W ))− I(Zi;W,M(W ), Zi−1)− nn
(e)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi(W );W,M(W ), S(W ), Y
n
i , Z
i−1)− I(Yi;Xi(W )) + I(Zi;Xi(W ))
+ I(Yi;W,M(W ), Z
i−1, Y ni+1)− I(Zi;W,M(W ), Zi−1, Y ni+1)− nn
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi(W );Vi, Yi)− I(Yi;Xi(W )|Ui) + I(Zi;Xi(W )|Ui)− nn,
where (d) follows from the fact that conditioned on W = w, we have the Markov chains Xi(w) −
(M(w), S(w), Xi−1(w), Y n)− Zi−1 and (Yi, Zi)−Xi(w)− (M(w), Y ni+1, Zi−1, Xn\i(w)) which hold
due to the memoryless properties of the “channel” PY n,Zn|Xn(w)(yn, zn|xn) =
∏n
i=1 PY,Z|X(yi, zi|xi)
and from the Markov chain (Yi, Zi) − Xi(W ) −W , (e) follows from the Csisza´r’s sum identity [24]
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which in this case is
∑n
i=1 I(Yi;Z
i−1|W,M(W ), Y ni+1) − I(Zi;Y ni+1|W,M(W ), Zi−1) = 0, and finally
(f) follows from the definitions of Ui and Vi, and the Markov chain Ui −Xi(W )− (Yi, Zi).
Lastly, the secret key rate can be bounded as follows.
n(Rs − δn) ≤ min
W∈W(n)
H(S(W )) ≤ 1
K
K∑
w=1
H(S(w)|W = w) = H(S(W )|W )
= H(S(W )|W, M¯, Zn) + I(S(W ); M¯, Zn|W )
= H(S(W )|W, M¯, Zn) + 1
K
K∑
w=1
I(S(w); M¯, Zn|W = w)
≤ H(S(W )|W, M¯, Zn) + max
W∈W(n)
I(S(W ); M¯, Zn)
(a)
≤ H(S(W )|W, M¯, Zn) + nδn (17)
(b)
≤ H(S(W )|W, M¯, Zn)−H(S(W )|W, M¯, Y n) + nδn + nn
= I(S(W );Y n|W, M¯)− I(S(W );Zn|W, M¯) + nδn + nn
(c)
= I(S(W );Y n|W,M(W ))− I(S(W );Zn|W,M(W )) + nδn + nn
=
n∑
i=1
I(S(W );Yi|W,M(W ), Y ni+1)− I(S(W );Zi|W,M(W ), Zi−1) + nδn + nn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(S(W );Yi|W,M(W ), Y ni+1, Zi−1)− I(S(W );Zi|W,M(W ), Y ni+1, Zi−1) + nδn + nn
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Yi|Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui) + nδn + nn, (18)
where (a) follows from the key leakage constraint, (b) follows from Fano’s inequality, (c) follows from
the fact that conditioned on W = w, we have the Markov chain (S(w), Y n, Zn) −M(w) − M¯\w (cf.
Appendix B (IV)), (d) follows from the Csisza´r’s sum identity, and (e) follows from the definitions of
Ui and Vi.
The proof ends with the standard steps for single letterization using a time-sharing random variable
and letting δn, n → 0 as n→∞. The cardinality bounds on the sets U and V can be proved using the
support lemma [24], and is shown in Appendix C.
C. Binary Example
To demonstrate the derived tradeoff in Theorem 1, we consider simple binary examples of the special
cases in Remark 2 i) and ii) where the Markov chain X−Y −Z holds, i.e., X ∼ Bernoulli(1/2), Y is an
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erased version of X with erasure probability p, and Z is an erased version of Y with erasure probability
q.
1) When there is no identification rate constraint, the region Ri,X−Y−Z in Remark 2 i) reduces to the
set of all (RC , L,RS) such that
RC ≥ p(1− h(α)),
L ≥ (1− q)(1− p) + p(1− h(α)),
RS ≤ q(1− p)(1− h(α)),
for some α ∈ [0, 1/2], where h(·) is the binary entropy function. The proof is given in Appendix D
where setting U = ∅ in Remark 2 i) is optimal. We can see for example the tradeoff between the
secret key rate and the leakage rate, i.e., to achieve a high secret key rate, we need to operate at a
higher compression rate and also allow higher amount of information leakage.
2) When there is no key rate constraint, the region Rii,X−Y−Z in Remark 2 ii) reduces to the set of
all (RI , RC , L) such that
RI ≤ (1− p)(1− h(α)),
RC ≥ RI + p(1− h(α)),
L ≥ 1− h(α)((1− p)q + p),
for some α ∈ [0, 1/2]. The proof follows similarly as that of Ri,X−Y−Z and is therefore omitted.
We can see a similar tradeoff between the identification rate and the leakage rate, e.g., to achieve a
high identification rate, we pay the cost of having high information leakage rate.
III. SECURE IDENTIFICATION/AUTHENTICATION WITH A PRIVACY CONSTRAINT
In this section we consider a new problem where the adversary is assumed to be active and tries to
deceive the identification/authentication system using its own data. The main difference from the previous
problem is that we impose a constraint on the false acceptance probability, replacing constraints on the
secret key rate and key leakage.
A. Problem Formulation
Let us now consider a secure identification/authentication system as shown in Fig. 1 with an active
adversary. Source, measurement, and side information alphabets, X ,Y,Z are assumed to be finite. The
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users’ source sequences Xn(w) for w ∈ W(n) , [1 : K] are independent across the users and have
i.i.d. components distributed according to some fixed source distribution PX . Measurement sequence and
side information (Y n, Zn) are assumed to be outputs of the memoryless channel with given transition
probability PY,Z|X and input Xn(W ), where W is the index representing an arbitrary unknown user who
presents itself to the system for identification/authentication.
The enrollment and identification/authentication phases follow similarly as in Section II-A. In the event
of an attack, the adversary presents to the decoder its own sequence y˜n ∈ Yn generated as a function
of M¯ and Zn, in order to gain access to the system. In this case, the adversary will first be identified
as one of the users according to the decoding function g(n)Id (M¯, y˜
n). Its estimate of the key is equal to
g
(n)
Au (M¯, y˜
n) which will then be compared with the original key of the user whom it is identified to be, e.g.,
S(g
(n)
Id (M¯, y˜
n)). We define a false acceptance event to be an event that g(n)Au (M¯, y˜
n) = S(g
(n)
Id (M¯, y˜
n)).
Operationally, it means that the adversary gains access as if it were user g(n)Id (M¯, y˜
n). The maximum
false acceptance probability (mFAP) is defined as maxy˜n(M¯,Zn)∈Yn P(g
(n)
Au (M¯, y˜
n) = S(g
(n)
Id (M¯, y˜
n))).2
Since the adversary will be identified as one of the users in the database, we are concerned about whether
it will also be positively authenticated and therefore wish to minimize the maximum false acceptance
probability exponentially.
As before, information leakage rate of user W at the adversary who has access to the stored database
M¯ and side information Zn is given by the mutual information rate I(Xn(W ); M¯, Zn)/n.
We are interested in characterizing the optimal tradeoff between the identification rate, compression
rate, information leakage rate, and mFAP exponent.
Definition 3: An (|M(n)|, |W(n)|, n)-code for secure identification and authentication with a privacy
constraint consists of
• A set of stochastic encoders F (n)w : w ∈ W(n) such that the w-th encoder takes Xn(w) as input and
generates (M(w), S(w)) ∈M(n) × S(n) according to a conditional PMF p(m(w), s(w)|xn(w)).
• A decoder g(n)Id :M(n)
K × Yn →W(n), such that the identified user is Wˆ = g(n)Id (M¯, Y n).
• A decoder g(n)Au :M(n)
K × Yn → S(n), such that the estimated secret key is Sˆ = g(n)Au (M¯, Y n).
♦
Definition 4: An identification-compression-leakage-mFAP exponent tuple (RI , RC , L,E) ∈ R4+ is
said to be achievable if, for any δ > 0, there exists a sequence of (|M(n)|, |W(n)|, n)-codes such that
2We note that the maximization here is over the functions y˜n(·), not over the sequences in Yn.
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for all sufficiently large n,
max
W∈W(n)
P((Wˆ , Sˆ) 6= (W,S(W ))) ≤ δ, (19)
1
n
log
∣∣W(n)∣∣ ≥ RI − δ, (20)
1
n
log
∣∣M(n)∣∣ ≤ RC + δ, (21)
max
W∈W(n)
1
n
I(Xn(W ); M¯, Zn) ≤ L+ δ, (22)
max
y˜n(M¯,Zn)∈Yn
P(g(n)Au (M¯, y˜
n) = S(g
(n)
Id (M¯, y˜
n))) ≤ 2−n(E−δ). (23)
The identification-compression-leakage-mFAP exponent region R2 is defined as the closure of all achiev-
able tuples. ♦
B. Result
Theorem 2: The region R2 for the secure identification/authentication problem defined above is given
by a set of all tuples (RI , RC , L,E) ∈ R4+ such that
RI ≤ I(Y ;U), (24)
RC ≥ RI + I(X;V |Y ), (25)
L ≥ I(X;V, Y )− I(X;Y |U) + I(X;Z|U), (26)
E ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U), (27)
for some PX,Y,ZPV |XPU |V with |U| ≤ |X |+ 4, |V| ≤ (|X |+ 4)(|X |+ 2). 
Remark 3: The regions R1 and R2 specified in Theorems 1 and 2 have the same form. In particular,
the maximum mFAP exponent in Theorem 2 is equivalent to the maximum achievable secret key rate
in Theorem 1. This reveals a connection between the achievable secret key rate and the security of
identification/authentication system in terms of false acceptance probability.
Intuitively, the equivalence follows from the fact that the coding scheme used to prove Theorem 2 also
achieves negligible key leakage rate for each user, implying that the adversary has no useful knowledge
about the secret key. It can then only guess the secret key S from possible values in a set whose cardinality
is at least 2H(S). Therefore, the false acceptance probability is upper-bounded by 2−H(S) which is further
bounded by 2−n(Rs−δ) when translating to the problem with the secret key rate constraint. The same
observation holds true when specializing to the single user case [12]. This is also noted in [10] for the
case without adversary’s side information.
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Proof of Theorem 2: The proof of identification rate, compression rate, and information leakage
rate remain the same as in the previous problem in Section II. We will only provide the proof of the
mFAP exponent of which the main idea follows similarly as that in [10], [12].
Achievability: We use the same achievable scheme as in the proof of Theorem 1. For an achievable
mFAP exponent, we consider the adversary who knows m¯ = (m¯1, m¯2) and side information zn. Let
gId(·) and gAu(·) denote the decoding functions for identification and the secret key estimation in the
achievable scheme. The adversary tries to select a sequence y˜n(m¯, zn) that results in the estimated key
gAu(m¯, y˜
n) equal to the original key of the user it is identified to be, i.e., S(gId(m¯, y˜n)).
In the achievable scheme, the secret key is chosen as the subbin index of the selected codeword vn.
Thus, the adversary only needs to consider the secret key that results from codewords vn which are
jointly typical with xn. There are in total 2n(I(X;U,V )+2δ) such codewords generated.
From the binning scheme with uniform bin and subbin index assignment, we have that the joint
probability that a description m of certain user w˜ ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is selected and a certain secret key of
that user s(w˜) is chosen is equal to a total number of jointly typical codewords vn with corresponding
indices m(w˜) = (m1(w˜),m2(w˜)) and s(w˜) divided by a total number of jointly typical codewords vn.
That is,
P(M(w˜) = m,S(w˜) = s) ≤
⌈P(M(w˜)=m)·2n(I(X;U,V )+2δ)
|S|
⌉
2n(I(X;U,V )+2δ)
. (28)
Then
mFAP = max
y˜n(M¯,Zn)∈Yn
P(gAu(M¯, y˜n(M¯, Zn)) = S(gId(M¯, y˜n(M¯, Zn))))
= max
y˜n(·)∈Yn
∑
m¯
∑
zn
P(M¯ = m¯, Zn = zn, gAu(m¯, y˜n(m¯, zn)) = S(gId(m¯, y˜n(m¯, zn))))
= max
y˜n(·)∈Yn
∑
m¯
∑
zn
P(M¯ = m¯, S(gId(m¯, y˜n)) = gAu(m¯, y˜n)) · P(Zn = zn|M¯ = m¯, S(gId(m¯, y˜n)) = gAu(m¯, y˜n))
(a)
= max
y˜n(·)∈Yn
∑
m¯
∑
zn
(
P(M¯\gId(m¯,y˜n) = m¯\gId(m¯,y˜n)) · P(M(gId(m¯, y˜n)) = m(gId(m¯, y˜n)), S(gId(m¯, y˜n)) = gAu(m¯, y˜n))·
P(Zn = zn|M¯ = m¯, S(gId(m¯, y˜n)) = gAu(m¯, y˜n))
)
(b)
≤
∑
m
⌈P(M(gId(m¯,y˜n))=m)·2n(I(X;U,V )+2δ)
|S|
⌉
2n(I(X;U,V )+2δ)
≤
∑
m
(P(M(gId(m¯, y˜n)) = m) · 2n(I(X;U,V )+2δ)
|S| + 1
)
· 1
2n(I(X;U,V )+2δ)
(c)
= 2−n(I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;Z|U)−δ) + 2−n(I(V ;Y )−RI−3δ)
(d)
≤ 2−n(I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;Z|U)−δ′),
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where (a) follows since M¯\gId(m¯,y˜n) is independent of (M(gId(m¯, y˜n)), S(gId(m¯, y˜n))), (b) follows from
the uniform bin and subbin index assignment in the achievable scheme and from the bound in (28),
(c) follows from the code construction where |S| = 2n(I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;Z|U)−δ) and |M| = |M1||M2| =
2n(I(X;V |Y )+Ri+5δ), and (d) follows from the constraint RI < I(U ;Y ) derived for the identification rate
which together with the Markov chain U − V − Y makes I(V ;Y )−RI ≥ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U).
That is, we have
1
n
log
1
mFAP
≥ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)− δ′ ≥ E − δ′,
if E ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U).
Converse: We provide a converse proof for the mFAP exponent. Set Ui , (W,M(W ), Y ni+1, Zi−1)
and Vi , (W,M(W ), S(W ), Y ni+1, Zi−1) which satisfy Ui − Vi −Xi(W )− (Yi, Zi) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Let us define the set of secret key messages that can be reconstructed from m¯, i.e., C(m¯, w) = {s(w) :
there exists a yn ∈ Yn s.t. g(n)Au (m¯, yn) = s(w)}. Also, let C(·) be a function of s(w) and m¯, where
C(s(w), m¯) = 1 for s(w) ∈ C(m¯, w), and 0 otherwise. We have that
δn ≥ P((Sˆ, Wˆ ) 6= (S(W ),W ))
≥ P(Sˆ 6= S(W ), Wˆ = W )
≥ (1− δn)P(Sˆ 6= S(W )|Wˆ = W ),
where the last inequality follows from P(Wˆ = W ) ≥ 1 − δn. Thus, δ′n , δn1−δn ≥ P(Sˆ 6= S(W )|Wˆ =
W ) ≥∑m¯,w P(M¯ = m¯,W = w, S(W ) /∈ C(m¯, w)) = P(C = 0).
Now consider the following bound.
mFAP = max
y˜n(M¯,Zn)∈Yn
P(g(n)Au (M¯, y˜
n) = S(g
(n)
Id (M¯, y˜
n)))
= max
y˜n
∑
m¯,zn,w
P(M¯ = m¯, Zn = zn,W = w, g(n)Au (m¯, y˜
n) = S(g
(n)
Id (m¯, y˜
n)))
(a)
≥
∑
m¯,zn,w
P(M¯ = m¯, Zn = zn,W = w, S(w) = s˜(m¯, zn, w))
(b)
=
∑
m¯,zn,w
p(m¯, zn, w) max
s(w)∈C(m¯,w)
p(s(w)|m¯, zn, w)
≥
∑
m¯,zn,w
p(m¯, zn, w) max
s(w)∈C(m¯,w)
p(s(w), C = 1|m¯, zn, w)
≥
∑
m¯,zn,w
p(m¯, zn, w)p(C = 1|m¯, zn, w) · max
s(w)∈C(m¯,w)
p(s(w)|m¯, zn, w, C = 1), (29)
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where in (a), the adversary who knows m¯ and zn may choose y˜n that results in g(n)Id (m¯, y˜
n) = w, and
the corresponding MAP estimate of s(w), i.e.,
g
(n)
Au (m¯, y˜
n) , s˜(m¯, zn, w) = arg max
s(w)∈C(m¯,w)
p(s(w)|m¯, zn, w), (30)
and (b) follows from (30).
Then for any achievable E, it follows that
n(E − δn) ≤ log
( 1
mFAP
)
(a)
≤ − log (P(C = 1))− log ( ∑
m¯,zn,w
p(m¯, zn, w|C = 1) · max
s(w)∈C(m¯,w)
p(s(w)|m¯, zn, w, C = 1))
(b)
≤ − log(1− δ′n)−
∑
m¯,zn,w
p(m¯, zn, w|C = 1) · log ( max
s(w)∈C(m¯,w)
p(s(w)|m¯, zn, w, C = 1))
≤ − log(1− δ′n)−
∑
m¯,zn,w
(
p(m¯, zn, w|C = 1)·
∑
s(w)∈C(m¯,w)
p(s(w)|m¯, zn, w, C = 1) · log(p(s(w)|m¯, zn, w, C = 1))
)
= − log(1− δ′n) +H(S(W )|M¯, Zn,W,C = 1),
where (a) follows from (29) and (b) follows from P(C = 1) ≥ 1− δ′n and Jensen’s inequality [25].
Continuing the chain of inequalities with the fact that
(1− δ′n)H(S(W )|M¯, Zn,W,C = 1) ≤ P(C = 1)H(S(W )|M¯, Zn,W,C = 1) ≤ H(S(W )|M¯, Zn,W ),
we get
(1− δ′n) · [n(E − δn) + log(1− δ′n)] ≤ H(S(W )|M¯, Zn,W )
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Vi;Yi|Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui) + nn,
where (a) follows from the steps (17) to (18).
The proof ends with the standard steps for single letterization using a time-sharing random variable
and letting δn, n → 0 as n→∞.
IV. CONCLUSION
We studied two related problems of secret key-based identification and authentication under a privacy
constraint on the enrolled source data. An adversary is assumed to have access to the stored database of
helping data and the “online” side information correlated with the user’s data. First, we considered the
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case where the adversary is passive and characterized the optimal tradeoff region of the identification
rate, compression rate, leakage rate, and secret key rate for discrete memoryless sources. Then we
considered a variant of the problem where the adversary is active in the sense that it tries to deceive the
identification/authentication using its own data. In this problem, we characterized the optimal tradeoff
between the identification rate, compression rate, leakage rate, and mFAP exponent. Both results are
derived based on the same achievability scheme involving layered random binning and rate allocation
technique applied on the first layered codeword. They shed light on whether one should aim to design the
secret key-based identification/authentication system to achieve the highest secret key rate as the secret
key here is not for encryption but only for authentication purpose. It turned out that the maximum secret
key rate in the first problem is equivalent to the maximum achievable mFAP exponent in the second one,
revealing a close connection between security of identification/authentication system and the maximum
achievable secret key rate.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let T be a binary random variable taking value 0 if (Un(J(w)), Zn) ∈ T (n) , and 1 otherwise. Since
(Xn(w), Un(J(w)), V n(J(w),K(w)), Y n, Zn) ∈ T (n) with high probability, we have P(T = 1) ≤ δ.
It follows that
H(Zn|J(w))
(a)
≤ H(Zn, T |J(w), Un)
≤ H(Zn|Un, T ) +H(T )
= P(T = 0)H(Zn|Un, T = 0) + P(T = 1)H(Zn|Un, T = 1) +H(T )
(b)
≤ H(Zn|Un, T = 0) + δH(Zn) + h(δ)
≤ H(Zn|Un, T = 0) + nδ log |Z|+ h(δ)
=
∑
un∈T (n)
p(un|T = 0)H(Zn|Un = un, T = 0) + nδ log |Z|+ h(δ)
(c)
≤
∑
un∈T (n)
p(un|T = 0) log |T (n) (Z|un)|+ nδ log |Z|+ h(δ) ≤ n(H(Z|U) + δ′),
where (a) follows from the fact that given the codebook, Un is a function of J(w), (b) follows from
P(T = 1) ≤ δ where h(·) is the binary entropy function, and (c) follows from the property of jointly
typical set [21] with δ, δ′ → 0 as → 0, and → 0 as n→∞.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF MARKOV CHAINS IN CONVERSE OF THEOREM 1
We prove the Markov chains used in the converse proof of Theorem 1 based on the fact that, conditioned
on W = w, the joint PMF of (Xn(w), M¯ , S(w), Y n, Zn) is given by
P(Xn(w) = xn, M¯ = m¯, S(w) = s, Y n = yn, Zn = zn|W = w)
= P(Xn(w) = xn,M(w) = mw, S(w) = s|W = w)P(M¯\w = m¯\w|W = w)·
P(Y n = yn, Zn = zn|Xn(w) = xn).
(I) Y n −M(w)− M¯\w
Proof: Conditioned on W = w, we write the joint PMF of (Y n, M¯) as
P(Y n = yn, M¯ = m¯|W = w)
=
∑
xn
P(Xn(w) = xn,M(w) = mw|W = w)P(M¯\w = m¯\w|W = w)P(Y n = yn|Xn(w) = xn)
= P(M(w) = mw, Y n = yn|W = w)P(M¯\w = m¯\w|W = w)
which implies that Y n −M(w)− M¯\w forms a Markov chain.
(II) (M¯, S(w))−Xn(w)− (Y n, Zn)
Proof: Conditioned on W = w, we write the joint PMF of (Xn(w), M¯ , S(w), Y n, Zn) as
P(Xn(w) = xn, M¯ = m¯, S(w) = s, Y n = yn, Zn = zn|W = w)
= P(Xn(w) = xn,M(w) = mw, S(w) = s|W = w)P(M¯\w = m¯\w|W = w)·
P(Y n = yn, Zn = zn|Xn(w) = xn)
= P(Xn(w) = xn, M¯ = m¯, S(w) = s|W = w)P(Y n = yn, Zn = zn|Xn(w) = xn)
which implies the Markov chain (M¯, S(w))−Xn(w)− (Y n, Zn).
(III) (Xn(w), Zn)− Y n − M¯\w
Proof: Conditioned on W = w, we write the joint PMF of (Xn(w), M¯\w, Y n, Zn) as
P(Xn(w) = xn, M¯\w = m¯\w, Y n = yn, Zn = zn|W = w)
= P(Xn(w) = xn, Y n = yn, Zn = zn|W = w)P(M¯\w = m¯\w|W = w)
which implies the Markov chain (Xn(w), Zn)− Y n − M¯\w.
(IV) (Xn(w), Y n, Zn, S(w))−M(w)− M¯\w
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Proof: Conditioned on W = w, we write the joint PMF of (Xn(w), M¯ , S(w), Y n, Zn) as
P(Xn(w) = xn, M¯ = m¯, S(w) = s, Y n = yn, Zn = zn|W = w)
= P(Xn(w) = xn,M(w) = mw, S(w) = s|W = w)P(M¯\w = m¯\w|W = w)·
P(Y n = yn, Zn = zn|Xn(w) = xn)
= P(Xn(w) = xn,M(w) = mw, S(w) = s, Y n = yn, Zn = zn|W = w)P(M¯\w = m¯\w|W = w)
which implies the Markov chain (Xn(w), Y n, Zn, S(w))−M(w)− M¯\w.
APPENDIX C
CARDINALITY BOUNDS OF THE SETS U AND V IN THEOREM 2
Consider the expression of R1 in Theorem 1:
RI ≤ I(Y ;U)
RC ≥ RI + I(X;V |Y ),
L ≥ I(X;V, Y )− I(X;Y |U) + I(X;Z|U),
RS ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U),
for some U ∈ U , V ∈ V such that U − V −X − (Y, Z) forms a Markov chain.
We can rewrite some mutual information terms in the expression above as
RI ≤ H(Y )−H(Y |U)
RC ≥ RI +H(X|Y )−H(X,Y |V ) +H(Y |V ),
L ≥ H(X)−H(X,Y |V ) +H(Y |V )−H(Y |U) +H(Y |X) +H(Z|U)−H(Z|X),
RS ≤ H(Y |U)−H(Y |V )−H(Z|U) +H(Z|V ).
We will show that the random variables U and V may be replaced by new ones, satisfying |U| ≤
|X | + 4, |V| ≤ (|X | + 4)(|X | + 2), and preserving the terms H(X,Y |V ), H(Y |V ), H(Z|V ), H(Y |U),
and H(Z|U).
First, we bound the cardinality of the set U . Let us define the following |X |+ 4 continuous functions
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of p(v|u), v ∈ V ,
fj(p(v|u)) =
∑
v∈V
p(v|u)p(x|u, v), j = 1, . . . , |X | − 1,
f|X |(p(v|u)) = H(X,Y |V,U = u)
= H(X,Y, V |U = u)−H(V |U = u),
f|X |+1(p(v|u)) = H(Y |V,U = u)
= H(Y, V |U = u)−H(V |U = u),
f|X |+2(p(v|u)) = H(Z|V,U = u)
= H(Z, V |U = u)−H(V |U = u),
f|X |+3(p(v|u)) = H(Y |U = u),
f|X |+4(p(v|u)) = H(Z|U = u).
The corresponding averages are∑
u∈U
p(u)fj(p(v|u)) = PX(x), j = 1, . . . , |X | − 1,
∑
u∈U
p(u)f|X |(p(v|u)) = H(X,Y, V |U)−H(V |U),
∑
u∈U
p(u)f|X |+1(p(v|u)) = H(Y, V |U)−H(V |U),
∑
u∈U
p(u)f|X |+2(p(v|u)) = H(Z, V |U)−H(V |U),
∑
u∈U
p(u)f|X |+3(p(v|u)) = H(Y |U),
∑
u∈U
p(u)f|X |+4(p(v|u)) = H(Z|U).
According to the support lemma [24], we can deduce that there exists a new random variable U ′ jointly
distributed with (X,Y, Z, V ) whose alphabet size is |U ′| = |X |+4, and numbers αi ≥ 0 with
∑|X |+4
i=1 αi =
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1 that satisfy
|X |+4∑
i=1
αifj(PV |U ′(v|i)) = PX(x), j = 1, . . . , |X | − 1,
|X |+4∑
i=1
αif|X |(PV |U ′(v|i)) = H(X,Y, V |U ′)−H(V |U ′),
|X |+4∑
i=1
αif|X |+1(PV |U ′(v|i)) = H(Y, V |U ′)−H(V |U ′),
|X |+4∑
i=1
αif|X |+2(PV |U ′(v|i)) = H(Z, V |U ′)−H(V |U ′),
|X |+4∑
i=1
αif|X |+3(PV |U ′(v|i)) = H(Y |U ′),
|X |+4∑
i=1
αif|X |+4(PV |U ′(v|i)) = H(Z|U ′).
Note that we have
H(X,Y, V |U ′)−H(V |U ′)
= H(X,Y, V |U)−H(V |U)
(a)
= H(X,Y |V ),
where (a) follows from the Markov chain U − V − X − (Y,Z). Similarly, from the Markov chain
U − V −X − (Y, Z), we have that H(Y, V |U ′)−H(V |U ′) = H(Y, V |U)−H(V |U) = H(Y |V ), and
H(Z, V |U ′)−H(V |U ′) = H(Z, V |U)−H(V |U) = H(Z|V ). Since PX(x) is preserved, PX,Y,Z(x, y, z)
is also preserved. Thus, H(X|Y ), H(Y |X), H(Z|X) are preserved.
Next we bound the cardinality of the set V . For each u′ ∈ U ′, we define the following |X | + 2
continuous functions of p(x|u′, v), x ∈ X ,
fj(p(x|u′, v)) = p(x|u′, v), j = 1, . . . , |X | − 1,
f|X |(p(x|u′, v)) = H(X,Y |U ′ = u′, V = v),
f|X |+1(p(x|u′, v)) = H(Y |U ′ = u′, V = v),
f|X |+2(p(x|u′, v)) = H(Z|U ′ = u′, V = v).
Similarly to the previous part in bounding |U|, there exists a new random variable V ′|{U ′ = u′} ∼ p(v′|u′)
such that |V ′| = |X |+ 2 and p(x|u′), H(X,Y |U ′ = u′, V ), H(Y |U ′ = u′, V ), and H(Z|U ′ = u′, V ) are
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preserved.
By setting V ′′ = (V ′, U ′) where V ′′ = V ′ × U ′, we have that U ′ − V ′′ −X − (Y, Z) forms a Markov
chain.
Furthermore, we have the following preservations by V ′′,
H(X,Y |V ′′)
= H(X,Y |V ′, U ′)
(a)
= H(X,Y |V,U ′)
(b)
= H(X,Y |V,U)
(c)
= H(X,Y |V ),
where (a) follows from preservation by V ′, (b) follows from preservation by U ′, and (c) follows from
the Markov chain U −V −X− (Y,Z). Similarly, from preservation by U ′ and V ′, and the Markov chain
U−V −X−(Y, Z), we have that H(Y |V ′′) = H(Y |V ′, U ′) = H(Y |V ) and H(Z|V ′′) = H(Z|V ′, U ′) =
H(Z|V ).
Therefore, we have shown that U ∈ U and V ∈ V may be replaced by U ′ ∈ U ′ and V ′′ ∈ V ′′ satisfying
|U ′| = |X |+ 4,
|V ′′| = |U ′||V ′| = (|X |+ 4)(|X |+ 2),
and preserving the terms H(X,Y |V ), H(Y |V ), H(Z|V ), H(Y |U), and H(Z|U).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THE COMPRESSION-LEAKAGE-KEY RATE REGION IN THE BINARY EXAMPLE
Achievability: Let V be an output of a BSC(α) with input X , where α ∈ [0, 1/2]. Then by setting
U = ∅, it follows from the expression in Remark 2 i) that
RC ≥ I(X;V |Y )
(a)
= p · (H(X)−H(X|V ))
(b)
= p · (1− h(α)),
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where (a) follows since Y = e with probability p, otherwise Y = X , and (b) follows from the choice
of V ,
L ≥ I(X;Z) + I(X;V |Y )
(a)
= 1−H(X|Z) + p · (1− h(α))
(b)
= 1− ((1− p)q + p) + p · (1− h(α))
= (1− q)(1− p) + p · (1− h(α)),
where (a) follows from the bound on RC and (b) follows since Z = e with probability (1 − p)q + p,
otherwise Z = X .
RS ≤ I(Y ;V |Z)
(a)
= I(X;V |Z)− I(X;V |Y )
(b)
= ((1− p)q + p) · I(X;V )− p · (1− h(α))
= q(1− p)(1− h(α)),
where (a) follows from the Markov chain V −X −Y −Z and (b) follows since Z = e with probability
(1− p)q + p, otherwise Z = X .
Converse: Let (RC , L,RS) be an achievable tuple. We now prove that there exist α ∈ [0, 1/2] satisfying
the inequalities shown in the achievability above. From the region specified in Remark 2 i), we have the
following bound on the compression rate RC .
RC ≥ I(X;V |Y )
= p · I(X;V )
= p · (1−H(X|V )).
Since 0 ≤ H(X|V ) ≤ H(X) = 1, and h(·) is a continuous one-to-one mapping from [0, 1/2] to [0, 1],
there exists α ∈ [0, 1/2] s.t. H(X|V ) = h(α), and thus RC ≥ p · (1− h(α)). The bounds on L and RS
readily follow from H(X|V ) = h(α).
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